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PRESS CENSORSHIP AND ACCESS RESTRICTIONS
DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: A FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Persian Gulf War began on August 2, 1990 when Iraqi forces,
massed on the Iraq-Kuwait border, invaded the tiny Gulf state of Kuwait
and quickly overwhelmed its armed forces.1 Official Iraqi statements
claimed that the invasion was undertaken at the request of a Kuwaiti
faction representing the legitimate government of Kuwait.2 Led by the
United States, nations around the world rushed military forces into Saudi
Arabia to form a coalition force, while the United Nations imposed un-
precedented economic and military sanctions on Iraq.3 The United Na-
tions Security Council passed a resolution giving Iraq until midnight on
January 15, 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait or face United Nations sanc-
tioned military attack.4 Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, refused to
order his armed forces to retreat from Kuwait.5 On January 16, 1991,
the United Nations coalition force in Saudi Arabia began an air bom-
bardment of Iraqi military forces and command and control centers in
preparation for a ground assault.6 On February 23, 1991, the coalition
forces entered Kuwait and captured or isolated thousands of Iraqi
soldiers.7 Quickly defeated, the Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait on
February 25, 1991.8
During the Persian Gulf War, the Pentagon imposed the tightest
restrictions on battlefield press coverage in American military history.9
The restrictions subjected all news gathered to a security review before it
could be published10 and severely restricted media access to the battle-
1. Kim Murphy, Iraq Tightens Grip on Kuwait, Sets Up Interim Government, L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al.
2. Lisa Beyer, Iraq's Power Grip, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 19.
3. See Lisa Beyer, The World Closes In, TIME, Aug. 20, 1990, at 27-29.
4. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45 Sess. (1991).
5. See Special Report: Witness to War, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1991, World Report, at 3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Thomas B. Rosenstiel, Gulf War No Model for Coverage, Media Tell Pentagon, L.A.
TIMES, July 1, 1991, at A4.
10. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1577-78
(1991).
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field.11 A small number of reporters were allowed access to the battle-
field in pool groups12 but had to remain with escorts at all times.'
3
"[C]ensorship created by the pool group system and mandatory security
reviews made the Gulf War the most undercovered major conflict in
American history."
1 4
This Comment explores the constitutionality of the restrictions
placed upon the media during the Persian Gulf War. First, this Com-
ment describes the history of media access to American military conflicts
prior to the Gulf War and any censorship imposed on the news gathered
by reporters. 5 Second, this Comment sets forth the Department of De-
fense (DOD) restrictions placed upon the media during the Persian Gulf
War. 6 Next, the First Amendment doctrines of prior restraint and right
of access are discussed in the context of their limit on the government's
ability to impose restrictions on the press. 7 This Comment then ana-
lyzes whether the restrictions placed upon the media during the Persian
Gulf War violated the First Amendment.II This Comment concludes by
recommending that in future military conflicts, the DOD should only
impose voluntary censorship on reporters and grant the media un-
restricted access to the battlefield.19
II. BACKGROUND
The history of American press coverage of military operations is
well documented and can be traced back to the Revolutionary War.20
Generally, the government has permitted the press widespread access to
the battlefield.21 Nevertheless, the government has, at times, instituted
11. Id at 1578-79.
12. Press pools consist of groups of reporters organized by the military. Malcolm W.
Browne, The Military vs; the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 29.
13. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1577-79.
14. U.S. News Executives Propose New War Coverage Guidelines, UPI, June 30, 1991
(LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File).
15. See infra notes 20-115 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 117-39 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 140-215 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 216-58 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 259-77 and accompanying text.
20. Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of
Access, Grenada, and "Off-the-Record Wars," 73 GEo. L.J. 931, 932 (1985).
21. See Howard B. Homonoff, Note, The First Amendment and National Security: The
Constitutionality of Press Censorship and Access Denial in Military Operations, 17 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 369, 380 (1985). While press access to military operations has been the
general rule, "'commando raids'-quick, surprise attacks designed to achieve limited, discrete
objectives-have routinely been conducted without the presence of reporters." Roger W. Pin-
cus, Comment, Press Access to Military Operations: Grenada and the Need for a New Analyti-
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censorship restrictions on the press in order to protect "national secur-
ity."'22 This section briefly chronicles the history of press access to
American military conflicts and the government limitations placed on
the publication of news gathered in those conflicts.23
A. The American War of Independence Through the Civil War
1. American War of Independence
During the early days of American history, no corps of professional
war reporters existed.24 Newspapers had no organized means of report-
ing on the American War of Independence and had to rely on private
letters as well as official and unofficial messages. 25 A few reporters were
present on the battlefield, however, covering the battles of Concord and
Lexington as well as other opening battles of the War of Independence.26
Despite the existence of censorship laws, there are no reported incidents
of press censorship during the war.27
2. War ofl812
During the War of 1812, news coverage of campaigns and incidents
was almost as unorganized as it was during the Revolutionary War.2"
Still, the press had access to the various battlefields including the Ameri-
can retreat from Washington 29 and the burning of the capital.3" While
official censorship did not exist,31 reporters did face impromptu extra-
legal censorship.3 2 For example, Andrew Jackson imposed his own code
cal Framework, 135 U. PA. L. Rv. 813, 837 (1987). In most military conflicts, the
government grants the press access to the battlefield. Nonetheless, the government did not
grant the press access to the "covert" Bay of Pigs operation. Id. In 1980 the government
excluded the press from covering the attempted rescue mission of the American hostages who
were held in Iran. Id.
22. Homonoff, supra note 21, at 372.
23. See infra notes 25-139.
24. Cassell, supra note 20, at 933.
25. FRANK L. MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM: A HISTORY 1690-1960, at 99 (3d ed.
1962).
26. JOHN HOHENBERG, FREE PRESS/FREE PEOPLE 54 (1971). For example, reporter
Isaiah Thomas was present at the battlefields and issued the first eyewitness account of the
American War of Independence in the Massachusetts Spy. Id. at 54-55.
27. Cassell, supra note 20, at 933. Although there was little censorship by legal means in
the Revolutionary period, the Tory press's liberty was threatened by mobs and threats of vio-
lence made by the Sons of Liberty. MOTr, supra note 25, at 103-04.
28. MOTT, supra note 25, at 196.
29. 200-Year Tradition Broken, NEWS, MEDIA & L., Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 4.
30. Id.
31. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, THE MEDIA AT WAR: THE PRESS AND THE PERSIAN
GULF CONFLICT 8 (1991).
32. JAMES R. MOCK, CENSORSHIP 1917, at 9 (1941).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
of censorship on reporters and, in a classic example of Jacksonian autoc-
racy, imprisoned a writer who opposed his rules.3"
3. Mexican-American War
The modem war correspondent emerged during the Mexican-Amer-
ican War of 1846-1847. 31 Newspaper reporters had widespread access to
the conflict's campaigns and battlefields35 and, for the first time ever,
newspapers printed extensive and comprehensive articles about the
war.36 Moreover, neither the government nor the military saw a need to
place any legal restrictions on reporters.37
4. Civil War
The American Civil War became the most thoroughly reported vio-
lent conflict of its time." Over 150 eyewitness correspondents served the
northern papers during the Civil War.39 In addition to allowing com-
plete press access to the battlefront, the government afforded the corre-
spondents many privileges, including the use of government horses,
wagons and transportation with baggage privileges on government
steamers and military trains." In turn, the newspapers devoted a signifi-
cant amount of space to military news of the Civil War.4'
The prolific coverage of the Civil War, however, occurred within a
system of sometimes heavy-handed censorship.42 Both the Union and
the Confederacy instituted censorship rules for the press.4 3 At the begin-
ning of the war, the Union government suggested voluntary self-imposed
newspaper censorship, but failed to provide guidelines, making the ap-
33. Id.
34. JOSEPH J. MATHEWS, REPORTING THE WARs 34 (1957).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 53.
37. Id. at 54.
38. MOT, supra note 25, at 329.
39. Id. at 332.
40. M. STEIN, UNDER FIRE: THE STORY OF AMERICAN WAR CORRESPONDENTS 21
(1968). Although the press had widespread access to the battlefield, certain military com-
manders distrusted and harassed the individual war correspondents. HOHENBERG, supra note
26, at 123. For example, General Henry W. Halleck expelled all newspaper correspondents
from the Union Forces in the East. Id Because of fear of security violations, General William
T. Sherman also kept reporters at a distance. Id.
41. MOT, supra note 25, at 329. New York papers such as the Times, Tribune and
World contained only 48 columns per issue and often devoted one-third of each issue to news
from the battlefront. Id.
42. Jack A. Gottschalk, "Consistent with Security".. . A History of American Military
Press Censorship, 5 CoMM. & L. 35, 36 (1983).
43. Id.
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proach unworkable.' On its own initiative, the War Department cen-
sored messages that were delivered over the telegraph lines." The
Postmaster General refused to distribute publications whose content was
deemed disloyal to the government." The military suspended the publi-
cation of the New York Journal of Commerce and the New York World
because they had printed false reports deemed harmful to the Union's
cause. 7 The military also ordered the Chicago Times to stop publication
temporarily because of its incessant attacks on the Lincoln Administra-
tion.48 The Confederacy, unrestricted by the Federal Constitution, im-
posed even more stringent censorship rules on the press.4 9 Southern
newspapers able to overcome the severe shortages of paper, ink and labor
had to be wary of using sensitive military information. 0 Once their cities
were occupied by the Union army, newspapers in New Orleans, Vicks-
burg and Memphis either submitted to federal censorship or were
suspended.51
B. The Spanish-American War Through World War I
1. Spanish-American War
Not surprisingly, during the "yellow journalism" 2-inspired Span-
ish-American War of 1889, the military allowed correspondents wide-
spread access to the battlefields and broad freedom to report the war
44. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 8. As ineffective as the voluntary
censorship agreement turned out to be in the Civil War, it stands as one of the earliest Ameri-
can efforts to employ a wartime code for information practices. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 227 (Harold L. Nelson ed., 1967). The principles
of voluntary censorship by the press and the maximum release of information by the govern-
ment enjoyed more success in World War I and World War II. Id.
45. MOCK, supra note 32, at 11.
46. Id.
47. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 9. The military suspended the New
York Journal of Commerce and the New York World for two days each for publishing a false
presidential proclamation calling for the draft of 400,000 men in 1864. HOHENBERG, supra
note 26, at 121. The military ordered the author of the hoax jailed for three months. Id.
48. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 9.
49. Id. at 8.
50. HOHENBERG, supra note 26, at 122.
51. Id. One newspaper, the Memphis Appeal, became a transient newspaper in order to
escape federal control; it was published in 10 towns in four states before the war ended. Id. at
123.
52. "Yellow journalism" is a term used to describe sensationalism in news stories. 7 Dic-
TIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 356 (1976). "At the turn of the [20th] century the scare
headline, the scandal section, the sob story, and elaborate Sunday features had become perma-
nent elements of the sensational press." Id. Historians have attributed yellow journalism to
starting the Spanish-American War. See MOTT, supra note 25, at 533-34.
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news.5 3 As many as 500 writers, photographers and artists representing
many newspapers and magazines were mobilized to cover the activities of
the blockading fleet.5 4 Reporters gathered at the Florida camps, went
into Cuba, sent news from Spain, and sailed with Dewey to Manila."
The Navy formed censorship units in mid-1898 led by a former New
York Tribune reporter, Grant Squires, who served as a liaison between
the military and the press. 6 The military did not enforce stringent cen-
sorship rules and, consequently, the newspapers freely printed reports of
Army and Navy movements. 7
2. World War I
During World War I, the military required war correspondents who
wanted access to the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France
and to the front lines to obtain accreditation.5" Accredited correspon-
dents enjoyed freedom and uninhibited access to the battlefield, and
could even report from front-line trenches if they so desired. 9 The con-
tent of the war correspondents' reports were subjected to military censor-
ship by the AEF's Intelligence Section of the General Staff.60 During
1917, while a press officer from what was then referred to as the Censor-
ship Division of the Intelligence Section reviewed reporters' correspon-
dence,6' reporters were not explicitly required to make any statement
contrary to their opinions.62
53. Morr, supra note 25, at 533-34.
54. Id. at 533.
55. Id. Few or no war correspondents actually tried to preserve their status as noncomba-
tants. Id. at 536. William Randolph Hearst led a force of 20 writers, photographers and
artists to the scene of the war and captured 26 Spanish soldiers. Id. at 535.
56. Gottschalk, supra note 42, at 38.
57. MoTr, supra note 25, at 536.
58. Id. at 620. Correspondents with the AEF were accredited upon the filing of a $2000
bond and a maintenance deposi of $1000. Id. Correspondents had to sign an agreement
which included the following restrictions:
[Tihe newspaper representative was to submit all correspondence, except personal
letters, to the press officer or his assistant (the personal letters were censored at the
base); the correspondent agreed to repeat no information he received at the front
unless it had previously passed the censor; he was to give neither name nor location
of any unit; there was to be no revelation of future plans or of any information that
Military Intelligence might have thought of value to the enemy; and, the correspon-
dent agreed to accept the press officer's instructions as to further censorship rules
from time to time.
MocK, supra note 32, at 103. Unaccredited correspondents were sometimes allowed to ob-
serve and to report on the war. MoTr, supra note 25, at 620-21.
59. MoTr, supra note 25, at 621.
60. MOCK, supra note 32, at 103-05.
61. See supra note 58.
62. MocK, supra note 32, at 103.
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In 1918 the Censorship Division promulgated rules governing the
content of correspondents' news coverage.63 These rules were aimed at
maximizing the amount of information reported to the public without
aiding the enemy." All newspaper articles had to meet the following
four conditions: (1) the article must be accurate in statement and impli-
cation; (2) the article must not supply military information to the en-
emy; (3) the article must not injure the morale of our forces abroad, at
home, or among our allies; and (4) the article must not embarrass the
United States or the Allies in neutral countries.6" Reporters who pub-
lished articles without clearing them with a censor had their credentials
revoked. 6 The vast majority of the reporters tolerated these rules67 and
only five journalists lost their accreditation.68
C. World War II Through the Invasion of Panama
1. World War II
World War II was "the most openly reported conflict in which the
United States has ever been involved, with some 2,000 correspondents in
action on all fronts for American news organizations."69 Photographers
brought a new and significant dimension to war reporting, and telephoto
by cable and wireless brought pictures to the news desks with a speed
and accuracy previously unknown. ° The press was allowed widespread
access to combat zones and even accompanied the military on aerial
bombing raids. 71 Seventy-eight reporters accompanied the first landing
forces in the invasion of Normandy.72 Additionally, a reporter for the
New York Times flew with the Army Air Corps during the atomic bomb-
ing of Nagasaki.7" To regulate the content of battlefield news, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the United States Office of Censor-
ship and named Byron Price, a well-respected newspaper man, to be its
director.74 Under a separate directive from Roosevelt, Director Price in-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 103-04.
65. Id. Additionally, there were specific rules that dealt with the manner in which a war
correspondent could identify persons and places without revealing sensitive information. Id.
at 104.
66. STEIN, supra note 40, at 72.
67. Homonoff, supra note 21, at 377.
68. HOHENBERG, supra note 26, at 184.
69. Id. at 258.
70. See MoTT, supra note 25, at 743.
71. Id. at 754.
72. Id. at 755-56.
73. HOHENBERG, supra note 26, at 270.
74. Morr, supra note 25, at 761.
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stituted a system of voluntary self-censorship for the press and issued A
Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press, which warned the
press against improper publication of news related to shipping, planes,
troops, fortifications, war production, armaments and weather.75 There
was no statutory sanction or any legal penalty which could be imposed
upon violators of the Code-compliance was voluntary76-- but the press
abided by the guidelines, thereby obviating the need for enforcement pen-
alties.77 While the Code's provisions applied to all the traditional catego-
ries of sensitive military information, some military commanders in the
field, unaccustomed to public scrutiny, imposed their own local rules of
censorship.78
2. The Korean War
A massive number of war correspondents covered the Korean War
from the front lines. 79 At the beginning of the conflict, press censorship
was purely voluntary.80 The self-censorship guidelines were vague, how-
ever, and not solely based on security and military exigencies.8 I After
newspapers printed stories about "panic, inferior U.S. equipment, and
South Korean civil corruption," the military implemented a mandatory
system of content censorship. 2 War correspondents had to submit all
news material, including film, to the military for approval.
8 3
3. The Vietnam War
In Vietnam, the accreditation program for war correspondents was
simple and straightforward and ensured the media access to combat ac-
tivities during the war.84 After applying for an entry visa, 5 the corre-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 762.
77. Id. at 763.
78. THE GANNETr FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 11. For example, General Douglas
MacArthur required each war correspondent's copy to go through a multiple censorship re-
view before being released. Id.
79. Morr, supra note 25, at 848.
By the time the U.N. counteroffensive began in September, 238 accredited
correspondents were in the fighting area... and seventy-two more had been issued
papers and were presumably on the way. This was more than half as many as had
covered the far-flung fighting fronts of World War II at any one time.
Id.
80. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 12.
81. Id.
82. Gottschalk, supra note 42, at 45-46.
83. Id. at 46.
84. PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY 403 (1975).
85. Entry visas were rarely denied. Id.
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spondent presented the United States authorities with either a letter from
a newspaper accepting responsibility for the correspondent, or a letter
from two organizations stating that they were prepared to buy the re-
porter's dispatches . 6 The correspondent was then given an accreditation
card which entitled him or her to "full co-operation and assistance...
rations and quarters on a reimbursable basis . . . and air, water, and
ground transportation.""7 The correspondent in turn agreed to a set of
ground rules regulating content to preserve military security.8 The vol-
untary system of self-censorship of news content was the only form of
censorship used during the Vietnam War. 9 The press voluntarily ob-
served the military security rules and in over four and one-half years,
dealing with over 2000 news media representatives, only six reporters
lost their DOD accreditation for security violations.9 0
4. Grenada
Despite the apparent success of the Vietnam ground rules in
preventing security leaks by the press, the military drastically changed its
policy of unrestricted access and voluntary censorship during its military
operations in Grenada.91 For the first time in American history the mili-
tary went beyond restrictions on press content and instituted restrictions
on press access.92 The commander of the Grenada invasion excluded the
news media from the entire island for the first two days of the opera-
tion.93 The military enforced this policy of complete press exclusion by
refusing to transport the members of the press to Grenada, by turning
away boats that the press had chartered, and by forcibly removing any
reporters who had reached the island.94 After three days, the military
allowed limited press access to the island.95
The complete denial of press access to the island of Grenada pro-
vided the Reagan Administration with a total monopoly of invasion-re-
lated information for the crucial initial days of the invasion.96 After
86. Id.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 14.
90. Id. at 14-15; Gottschalk, supra note 42, at 49.
91. THE GANNETr FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 15.
92. See supra notes 24-90 and accompanying text.
93. Jonathan Friendly, Accord Asked on Reporting of U.S. Military Operations, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1984, at A10.
94. Fred Hiatt, The Defense Department, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 4, 1984, at A17.
95. Bernard Weintraub, US. Press Curbs: The Unanswered Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 1983, § 1, at 1.
96. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 15.
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observing the situation first hand, many reporters found the Administra-
tion's explanation for the invasion unpersuasive. 97 By excluding the
press from the island, the military prevented any refutation of the Ad-
ministration's factual assertions about the situation in Grenada and
quashed debate on the propriety of the United States' invasion.98
The denial of media access during the invasion of Grenada came
about as a result of the military's sense of dissatisfaction with the results
of widespread press access and voluntary censorship in Vietnam. 99
There is little doubt in the minds of experienced observers that
post-Vietnam military attitudes influenced the decision to shut
the media out of the landing in Grenada and of the earliest
mop-up operations. The majors and commanders of the Viet-
nam War who believed the media had worked against the
American command there had become influential generals and
admirals determined not to expose the Grenada operation to
what they continue to view as a hostile adversary. That atti-
tude was reflected by President Reagan during a December
press conference when he said that in Vietnam the press was
not on "our side, militarily." 1°°
The policy of voluntary censorship in Vietnam resulted in media
reports of corruption in the South Vietnamese government and army and
of the harm inflicted upon Vietnamese civilians and their homeland by
United States military units. 101 Because such subjects were political
rather than strictly military in nature, they did not run afoul of the cen-
sorship provisions designed to protect military secrets and security.
0 2
United States military officials came to believe that the press undermined
public support for the Johnson and Nixon Administrations' Vietnam pol-
97. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, What Was He Hiding?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1983, at A19.
Two weeks after the invasion of Grenada, reporters declared that the Reagan Administration
lacked solid evidence to support its stated rationale for the invasion. Stuart Taylor, Jr., In
Wake of Invasion, Much Official Misinformation by U.S. Comes to Light, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1983, § 1, at 20. The Administration calculatedly disseminated inaccurate information, in-
cluding an inaccurate account of the number of Cubans on the island and the danger faced by
American medical students on the island. Id.
98. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 15.
99. Id.; see also Walter Goodman, Gulf Tensions: TV's Cause and Effect, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1991, at C24 (restricted media access resulted from media coverage of Vietnam War);
Thomas B. Rosenstiel & David Lamb, Military, Media Face Off in Gulf, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1991, at Al (fear of increased exposure to United States' military strategy led to restricted
media access).
100. Drew Middleton, Barring Reporters From the Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1984,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 36-37.
101. THE GANNETr FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 15.
102. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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icies.1°3 Thus, the new approach was to totally ban press access to the
Grenada war zone, obviating the need to control the content of news
coverage.) 4
The military has expressed satisfaction with the results of denying
the press access to Grenada. 05  "In many ... public statements and
articles, influential military officers have implied a causal relationship be-
tween two facts: that reporters were barred from on-the-ground cover-
age of the Grenada war in October 1983, and that Grenada has been
America's only unequivocal military victory since World War II.
''
1o6
5. Panama
When the United States invaded Panama in 1989, the press was
again denied access during the initial and most active hours of combat. 107
For the most part, the fighting had ended before most reporters were able
to investigate the battlefield situation.108 Not a single combat photo-
graph or combat eyewitness account was published.10 9 Even when re-
porters were allowed access to the battlefield, they could only move
around in groups of "press pools." 110 Since the war was short-lived, 1 '
by the time the newspapers reported the unbiased truth about the inva-
103. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 15. But see KNIGHTLEY, supra note
84, at 410-13 for a discussion of evidence that the news media's television coverage of Vietnam
either had no effect on public opinion or that television coverage of Vietnam increased support
of the war.
104. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 15.
105. Id.
106. Browne, supra note 12, at 30.
107. Patrick J. Sloyan, The War You Won't See, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1991, at C2.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Browne, supra note 12, at 29. The military decided which reporters could travel to the
front and be members of a press pool. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762
F. Supp. 1558, 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). No reporters could travel on their own as they had in
past wars. Id. at 1565. Further, even press pool groups had to remain with military escorts at
all times. Id.
11. Fighting in Panama began at 1:00 a.m. on Wednesday, December 20, 1989 and ended
on Friday, December 22, 1989. Douglas Jehl & Bob Specter, Invasion: A Web of Surprises,
L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1989, at Al.
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sion, 2 the public's interest in the invasion had diminished.' 13 The mili-
tary was pleased with the political results of the press pools and the
elimination of independent reporting in Panama through restricted press
access.1 4 Less than eight months later, the military revived the pool
system at the start of the Persian Gulf War and began one of the most
novel and comprehensive systems of press censorship in American
history. 1 5
6. Persian Gulf War
When the United States sent troops to the Middle East in the sum-
mer of 1990,116 the DOD issued regulations" 7 to restrict press access,
and thereby inherently restrict press coverage of events occurring in the
112. A significant amount of the initial information about the Panama invasion turned out
to be false. Douglas Jehl & John M. Broder, Accuracy a Casualty in Panama, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1990, at Al. For example, initially military officials stated that the Stealth bombers
performed their mission flawlessly, but later Pentagon officials admitted that the pilots had
confused and missed their targets. Id. Pentagon officials had stated that more than 300 Pana-
manian soldiers were killed, but later it was revealed that only approximately 50 soldiers were
killed. Id. The military has abandoned efforts to produce a final tally of civilians killed in the
invasion. Id at A16. Estimates range from the Southern Command's figure of 202 civilians
killed to more than 3000 civilians killed, as reported by former Attorney General Ramsey
Clark. Id. During the invasion, the military reported finding "cocaine" in Noriega's head-
quarters which later turned out to be tamale flour. Id. at Al.
113. Michael Linfield, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Press and the Persian
Gulf War, 25 BEVERLY HILLS B. Ass'N J. 142, 144 (1991).
114. Id
115. Id. at 144-45.
116. James Gerstenzang, U.S. Sends Planes, G.L's to Gulf, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at
Al.
117. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1563-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). The guidelines that were in effect during the Persian Gulf War follow:
GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA
News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional
gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, bat-
teries, cables, converters, etc.
Night Operations-Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only ap-
proved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including
flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless
specifically approved by the on-scene commander.
Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs es-
cort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments,
a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission re-
quirements as determined by the host commander.
Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is
extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must
be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have
been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of
a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual
media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identi-
fying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified.
The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value
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of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers
will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.
To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of
operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities,
media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces.
U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to
join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News
media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will
not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from at-
tempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain
extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the
area of operation all unauthorized individuals.
For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:
(1) Upon registering with the JIB [Joint Information Bureau], news media
should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool opera-
tions.
(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the [sic] subject to review
before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans,
capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would
jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Ma-
terial will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not
for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs es-
cort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the
reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a
reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed material to JIB
Dhahran for review by JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative.
If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to
OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on
publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.
(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.
Id. at 1577-78. The following ground rules were also in effect during the Persian Gulf War:
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD GROUND RULES
The following information should not be reported because its publication or broad-
cast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:
(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop
strength, aircraft, weapon systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g. artillery,
tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel
moved by support units or on hand combat units. Unit size may be described in
general terms such as "company-size," "multi-battalion," "multi-division," "naval
task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and sup-
plies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."
(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes,
including postponed or canceled operations.
(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific loca-
tion of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or en-
campments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can
identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is
coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories writ-
ten in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near Kuwaiti bor-
der," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the
report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged
its participation.
(4) Rules of engagement details.
(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods,
and results.
(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop move-
ments, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational se-
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Persian Gulf before and during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. 118 The
regulations required news media personnel to remain with an escort
while on all Saudi bases and some United States bases. 1 9 Moreover, no
individual reporting or coverage of events was allowed. 120 News media
personnel had to join pool groups to gain access to the combat coverage
and any person who was not a member of a pool group was not allowed
to be present in any area of military operation.121
The pools were allegedly a cooperative arrangement designed to bal-
ance the news media's desire for unilateral coverage with the "logistical
realities" of the military operation. 122 The DOD did not allow every
news reporter who desired to be a pool member to join the pools but,
rather, limited press pool access to a minute percentage of the newsper-
sons present. 123 Not only did the DOD greatly limit the number of pool
curity and lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size
of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.
(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land or car-
rier-based.
(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage,
cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security
measures.
(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while
search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.
(11) Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., air ops angles of attack or
speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or
"fast" may be used.
(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used
against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses
of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical
advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and
casualties may be described as "light, .... moderate," or "heavy."
Id. at 1581.
118. General Colin Powell explained the meaning of the terms "Operation Desert Shield"
and "Operation Desert Storm":
[The military went to the Persian Gulf initially to] put a deterrent and defensive force
on the ground, to stop any further aggression by the Iraqi army and Saddam Hussein
... to let him know that the armed forces of the United States of America ... are on
the ground and in the desert serving as a shield.... The shield had served its purpose
and a storm was now about to descend on Saddam Hussein.
National Newspaper Government Affairs Conference, Federal News Service, Mar. 15, 1991
(LEXIS, World Library, Gulf File).
119. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1577.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1578.
123. Id. In fact, one of the plaintiffs in the Nation Magazine suit, Agence France-Press,
was excluded from the media pool and sued the DOD, alleging the pool membership restric-
tions violated the First Amendment. Id. at 1562.
Most reporters were excluded from pool membership. THE GANNE'I-r FOUNDATION,
supra note 31, at 18.
By the eve of the allied offensive into Kuwait and Iraq in late February [1991], when
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participants, it also allowed only those members of the news media who
met the DOD criteria124 to become pool members. 2 Using this criteria,
the DOD further restricted the limited pool access to those members of
the "media that principally serve the American public and that... [had]
a long-term presence covering Department of Defense military
operations." 1
26
Pool membership was essential to obtaining access to information
involving United States and Allied Forces in the Persian Gulf. 27 Only
pool participants could enter forward areas during combat activities.'
2 8
The press was unable to freely observe all military activities.' 2 9 The mili-
tary determined where pool members could travel and journalists had to
remain with their escorts at all times.' 30 Membership in the standing
pools rotated every two to three weeks so not all pool members partici-
pated in each expedition to the front lines. 3 ' Additionally, the regula-
tions required pool participants to share media products only with other
pool members.' 32 Thus, a non-pool media representative had no access
to military operations or information.
33
After pool participants gathered news, it was subject to a more
traditional content review by a DOD public affairs officer before dissemi-
nation. 134  According to the regulations, the security review's purpose
those numbers [of journalists] peaked, more than 1,400 journalists, photographers
and other news media personnel were in the region. Of that number, only 192 had
been allowed to join military units through membership in one of the 24 press pools.
Id.
124. The DOD criteria were as follows:
CENTCOM POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
Pool Participation
Due to logistics and space limitations, participation in the pools will be limited
to media that principally serve the American public and that have had a long-term
presence covering Department of Defense military operations, except for pool posi-
tions specifically designated as "Saudi" or "international." Pool positions will be
divided among the following categories of media: television, radio, wire service, news
magazine, newspaper, pencil, photo, Saudi, and international. Media that do not
principally serve the American public are qualified to participate in the CENTCOM
media pool in the international category.
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578.
125. Id. at 1564.
126. Id. at 1578. For press representatives who did not meet the membership criteria, the
DOD created a pool designated as "international." Id. at 1579.
127. Id. at 1564.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1565.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1564.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1565.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
was to determine if the news reports contained any information that
would jeopardize either a military operation or the general security of the
United States or coalition troops. 135 If the media representative and the
public affairs officer disagreed about the sensitive nature of particular
news gathered, the disputed information was sent to the director of the
Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Dhahran.' 36 If an agreement could
not be reached, the issue was forwarded to the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for review.137 The guidelines pro-
vided that "[t]he ultimate decision on publication would be made by the
originating reporter's news organization."138 The security review system
caused significant delays and, therefore, the news organization's ultimate
discretion to publish information was little more than a shallow conces-
sion by the military. 3 9
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Constitutionality of Censorship and Restricting Press Access to
the Battlefield
During the Persian Gulf Crisis, the DOD promulgated regulations
restricting both media news content and media access to the conflict.140
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
press against pre-publication censorship and access restrictions.1 4' The
First Amendment provides in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of ... the press." '142 The United States
Supreme Court has considered the scope of the First Amendment's pro-
tection of freedom of the press during wartime only once, in New York
Times Co. v. United States, 4 ' more commonly known as the "Pentagon
Papers" case.1" The Court's interpretation of the First Amendment in
135. Id. at 1577.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1578.
138. Id.
139. See Journalists Call For Meetings With Cheney, IAC, July 1, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI File). "Stories and film of the one-sided victory from the field were delayed
for days. A few reporters arriving from Iraq and Kuwait after the cease-fire beat their own
reports back." Military Pool Broke Down, Gannett News Serv., Mar. 4, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis
Library, OMNI File). The government stated that news organizations should expect delays of
a year to eighteen months before they receive footage shot during the Persian Gulf War. Jour-
nalists Call For Meetings With Cheney, supra.
140. See supra note 117.
141. See infra notes 146-215 and accompanying text.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
143. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
144. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1420 (11 th ed. 1985).
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New York Times, as well as in other cases, posits the proper framework
for analyzing the DOD regulations.14
1. Prior restraints
Prior restraints-restrictions on expression imposed before publica-
tion or broadcasting-are regarded as a more significant infringement on
First Amendment rights than punishments imposed on a speaker subse-
quent to the making of the prohibited statements.146 The Supreme Court
first discussed the constitutionality of prior restraints on military-related
information in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson.147 In Near, a Minnesota
statute mandated that one who engaged "in the business of regularly or
customarily producing [or] publishing... a malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspaper... is guilty of a nuisance, and ... may be en-
joined."14 An action was brought under the statute to enjoin the publi-
cation of an article in The Saturday Press.49 A series of articles charged
that a Jewish gangster controlled gambling, bootlegging and racketeering
in Minneapolis, and that law enforcement officers and agencies were not
energetically performing their duties to arrest his activities1 50 The trial
court declared that The Saturday Press was a nuisance and enjoined the
defendants from producing, editing or publishing any publication that
was malicious, scandalous or defamatory and from further conducting a
nuisance under the name and title of The Saturday Press.15 ' Defendant
Near appealed to the state supreme court who affirmed the judgment of
the lower court. 152 Near then appealed the decision to the United States
Supreme Court. 53 The Supreme Court reversed the decision and held
145. See infra notes 146-215 and accompanying text.
146. Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-15 (1931). Traditionally, the gen-
eral purpose of the First Amendment's provision protecting the freedom of the press was to
protect against previous restraints on publication. Id. at 713.
147. Id. at 716.
148. Id. at 702. Section one of the statute provided:
Any person who, as an individual, or as a member or employee of a firm, or associa-
tion or organization, or as an officer, director, member or employee of a corporation,
shall be engaged in the business of regularly or customarily producing, publishing or
circulating, having in possession, selling, or giving away (a) an obscene, lewd and
lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, or (b) a malicious, scandalous
and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical, is guilty of a nuisance, and
all persons guilty of such nuisance may be enjoined, as hereinafter provided.
Id. (citing 1925 MINN. SEss. LAw 285 (Mason)).
149. Id. at 703.
150. Id. at 704. The complaint alleged that on eight subsequent dates the defendant period-
ical published articles that were largely malicious, scandalous and defamatory. Id. at 703.
151. Id. at 706.
152. Id. at 706-07.
153. Id. at 707.
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that the statute, as applied, was an unconstitutional prior restraint be-
cause it infringed upon freedom of the press.'54 In dicta, the Court cre-
ated an exception to the general rule that prior restraints are
unconstitutional:' 55
[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely
unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in ex-
ceptional cases: When a nation is at war. . . [n]o one would
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruc-
tion to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing
dates of transports or the number and location of troops. 156
In New York Times Co. v. United States 157 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a prior restraint on the publication of mil-
itary information. 5 8 The federal government sought to enjoin the New
York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a
classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on
Viet Nam Policy."'5 9 In a short per curiam opinion, the Court cited the
general rule that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional valid-
ity"'' and, therefore, the government "carries a heavy burden of show-
ing justification for the imposition of such a restraint."' 16 1 Without
further explanation, the Court concluded that the government did not
meet its burden of proof and the prior restraint was unconstitutional.
162
In a concurring opinion, Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas
joined,16 addressed the importance of allowing the press to publish mili-
tary information during wartime. 16 Justice Black wrote:
The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so
that the press would remain forever free to censure the Govern-
ment. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets
of government and inform the people. Only a free and unre-
strained press can effectively expose deception in government.
154. Id. at 722-23.
155. Id. at 716 (dicta).
156. Id. (dicta) (citations omitted).
157. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
158. Id. at 714.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
161. Id. (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
162. Id.
163. Justice Douglas also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Black
joined. Id. at 720-24 (Douglas, J., concurring). In Justice Douglas' view, the government
could never restrain the press from publishing an article. Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
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And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the
duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the
people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign
fevers and foreign shot and shell."'5
Justice Black rejected the government's argument that the newspapers
should be enjoined in the name of national security.' 6 6 Instead, Justice
Black found the word "security" to be a broad, vague generality that
should not be invoked to abrogate the First Amendment's protection of a
free press.'
67
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, recognized that the First
Amendment bans prior restraints and this ban can only be overridden
when the nation is at war.168 In Justice Brennan's view, the government
did not meet its burden of proof because it did not even allege that publi-
cation of items from a classified study would "inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the
safety of a transport already at sea [and, therefore, the evidence does not]
... support even the issuance of an interim restraining order."'' 69 With-
out proof that publication of the contents of the study would cause great
harm, Justice Brennan concluded that any restraints on the publication
of the article would have violated the First Amendment.
70
Although the Justices wrote a very brief per curiam opinion in New
York Times, the six concurring opinions provide some guidance on the
question of whether a prior restraint on the publication of news in a war-
time situation would be unconstitutional. 71 Based on those opinions,
the government must present a heavy justification for imposing prepubli-
cation censorship on the media.'
72
165. Id. (Black, J., concurring).
166. Id at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
170. Id at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring).
171. But see Homonoff, supra note 21, at 389 (arguing that implications of New York Times
are difficult to determine).
172. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714. In a later case, a district court upheld a prior
restraint on publication in peacetime because of national security concerns. In United States v.
Progressive, Inc. the federal government sought. an injunction against The Progressive magazine
from publishing any restricted data in an article entitled "The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got
It, Why We're Telling It." 467 F. Supp. 990, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (preliminary injunction
issued Mar. 28, 1979), mandamus denied, 443 U.S. 709, appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th
Cir. 1979) (moot). The district court relied on New York Times and Near when it articulated
the test for determining the constitutionality of a prior restraint. Id. at 1000. The court held
that a prior restraint was constitutional if the government could prove that there was a "likeli-
hood of direct, immediate and irreparable injury to our nation and its people." Id. The court
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2. Right of access
Although the issue of the media's right of access to military opera-
tions has been raised, a court has never decided whether the press has a
First Amendment right of access to military operations. 7 3 In Flynt v.
Weinberger,'74 the first case to challenge the government's denial of me-
dia access to military operations, the court refused to reach the merits of
the case. 7 The plaintiffs challenged the government's decision to pro-
hibit press coverage of the initial stages of the United States military in-
tervention in Grenada via a blanket denial of press access.176 By the time
the district court decided the case, the United States' military interven-
tion in Grenada was over and only a small detachment of 300 military
personnel remained on the island. 177 The court refused to reach the mer-
its of the case,178 holding that the plaintiffs' claim was moot. 79 On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision that the controversy was moot, but vacated
the remainder of the district court's opinion.' 80
held that the government proved that publishing the article would irreparably harm the na-
tional security of the United States by providing information that could assist other nations in
developing thermonuclear weapons. Id. at 999. Thus, the court held that the facts of the case
fell into the national security exception in which a prior restraint on publication is appropriate.
Id. at 1000.
173. When the military denied the media access to the United States invasion of Grenada, a
publisher filed suit. Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57 (1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court refused to decide the merits of the First Amendment
right of access claim. Id at 60. When the military restricted press access to the Persian Gulf
War, another suit was filed and, again, a court declined to decide the case on the merits.
Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1572 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
174. 588 F. Supp. 57 (1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
175. Id. at 60.
176. Id at 58. Plaintiffs, who were American publishers, sought an injunction prohibiting
United States military authorities from preventing or otherwise hindering plaintiffs from send-
ing reporters to Grenada to gather news. Id. Plaintiffs also asked the court to declare that the
defendants' conduct of preventing plaintiffs' efforts to send reporters to Grenada for the pur-
pose of gathering news violated the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. Id
177. Id.
178. In the district court's decision, the court stated that if it were to decide the merits of
the case, it would not issue an injunction restraining the government from restricting press
access to future United States military operations. Id. at 60 (dicta). The court explained that
national security concerns would justify excluding the press from military operations, Id.
(dicta). The court, however, did not expound any First Amendment theory or test for denying
the press access. See id.
179. Id. at 59, 61. Ironically, the court decided that the situation did not fall within the
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. at 59. Yet,
five years later, the situation was repeated as the press was completely barred from reporting
the initial hours of the United States' invasion of Panama. See supra notes 107-10 and accom-
panying text.
180. Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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In Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense, 8 ' the
plaintiffs"8 2 challenged the regulations promulgated by the DOD 183 to
govern military activities of American armed forces in the war against
Iraq.'84 The plaintiffs maintained that the regulations violated the First
and Fifth Amendments."8 5 The plaintiffs specifically claimed that the
press has a First Amendment right to unlimited access to a foreign arena
when American military forces are engaged in military operations.'" 6
The plaintiffs urged that the DOD pooling regulations, which limited
access to the battlefield to a specified number of press representatives and
subjected them to certain restrictions, infringed on news gathering privi-
leges accorded by the First Amendment. 8 ' The federal district court
rejected the defendants' arguments that: (1) the plaintiffs had no stand-
ing to bring the suit; 88 (2) the court should decline to hear the merits of
the case because it is a non-justiciable political question; 8 9 and (3) be-
181. 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
182. The plaintiffs were: The Nation magazine (The Nation Company, Inc.), Harper's mag-
azine, In These Times (The Institute of Public Affairs, Inc.), Pacific News Service (Bay Area
Institute, Inc.), The Guardian (Institute for Independent Social Journalism, Inc.), The Progres-
sive magazine (The Progressive, Inc.), Mother Jones magazine (Foundation for National Pro-
gress, Inc.), The LA. Weekly (Los Angeles Weekly, Inc.), The Village Voice (VV Publishing
Corp.), The Texas Observer (The Texas Observer Publishing Company), Pacifica Radio News
(The Pacifica Foundation, Inc.), Sydney H. Schanberg, E.L. Doctorow, William Styron,
Michael Klare, and Scott Armstrong. Id.
183. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
184. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1560.
185. Id. at 1560-61.
186. Id. at 1561.
187. Id
188. Id. The court stated:
For a plaintiff to have standing to raise constitutional claims, he must show he has
suffered an actual or threatened injury which is fairly traceable to the defendant's
conduct and which is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.... [C]ourts
should also consider whether there are any prudential concerns that militate against
granting standing to the plaintiff.
Id. at 1565-66. The court concluded that the harms alleged by the plaintiffs were "distinct and
palpable" because in both their access denial and discrimination claims the plaintiffs alleged
injury to their First and Fifth Amendment interests. Id. Further, one plaintiff was denied
access to the pools and clearly suffered immediate injury resulting from the regulations, which
definitively resolved the standing issue. Id. For a discussion of the standing doctrine, see
GUNTHER, supra note 144, at 1559-80.
189. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1561. The court described the political question
doctrine as encompassing three inquiries: "(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions
committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would
resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise?
(iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?" Id at 1566. The
court acknowledged a long line of cases addressing the role of the judiciary in reviewing mili-
tary decisions made by the Executive Branch pursuant to its Article II powers under the Con-
stitution. Id. The court stated that these cases caution courts not to interfere with the unique
structure of the military. Id. at 1566-67. The court distinguished the case before them from
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cause the regulations restricting media access were lifted, the controversy
was moot.190 The court refused to reach the merits of the case,191 how-
ever, by concluding that although it had the power to hear the case, it
was inappropriate for the court to utilize its power because the plaintiffs'
issues were not presented in a "clean-cut and concrete form."' 92 The
the previous cases because the plaintiffs were not challenging the military's goals, directive or
tactics. Id. at 1567. The court held that the President's Article 11 powers as Commander-in-
Chief were not implicated because resolution of the case did not impact on the internal func-
tioning and operation of the military and, therefore, the question of what restrictions may be
placed on the press's access to combat zones is not committed by the text of the Constitution to
a coordinate branch of government. Id. The court concluded that the question of access
would not require it to move beyond traditional areas of judicial expertise because clearly the
federal judiciary is competent to decide questions of First Amendment freedoms and Fifth
Amendment equal protection claims. Id. Thus, the court decided that the mere fact that the
DOD promulgated the regulations to restrict press access during military operations does not
render the controversy a non-justiciable political question. Id. at 1568. For a discussion of the
political question doctrine, see GUNTHER, supra note 144, at 1608-21.
190. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1561. The court explained that "a case becomes
moot when the issues 'presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome."' ld at 1568 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982)).
The rationale of the rule is that a controversy must exist so that the court does not render
advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law. Id. One exception to the mootness doctrine
is if the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. The exception applies when
two elements are satisfied. "First, the challenged action must have been too short in duration
to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration. Second, there must be a 'reasonable
expectation' that the party bringing the action would be 'subjected to the same action again.'"
Id. (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). The court noted the speed with
which recent wars had terminated and decided that the issue of press access met the first
element of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review test.". Id. at 1569. The court also
noted that in the last three military efforts of the United States abroad, various types of pooling
arrangements were utilized and the DOD admitted that the regulations could be reactivated.
Id. The court found it reasonable to assume that if the regulations were reinstated, the same
plaintiffs would sue and the second element of the test would be satisfied. Id. The court
concluded that it had the power to hear the case on the merits if any of the plaintiffs' claims
were eligible for the relief sought. Id. For a discussion of the mootness doctrine, see GUN-
THER, supra note 144, at 1578-80.
191. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1571-75.
192. Id. at 1570-75. The court explained:
Since the principles at stake are important and require a delicate balancing, prudence
dictates that we leave the definition of the exact parameters of press access to military
operations abroad for a later date when a full record is available, in the unfortunate
event that there is another military operation.
Id. at 1572. The court also refused to decide the merits of the plaintiffs' second claim that the
government acted in a discriminatory manner when it gave some members of the press prefer-
ential treatment in the form of financial assistance and more extensive access to events, thereby
violating the First and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 1573-75. The court noted that the plaintiffs
refused to propose alternative regulations. Id. at 1575. Instead, the plaintiffs continued to ask
for unlimited unilateral access. Id. The court explained that it "should not now be evaluating
a set of regulations that are currently being reviewed for probable revision, to determine their
reasonableness in the context of a conflict that does not exist and the precise contours of which
are unknown and unknowable." Id.
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court explained: "Pursuant to long-settled policy in the disposition of
constitutional questions, courts should refrain from deciding issues
presented in a highly abstract form, especially in instances where the
Supreme Court has not articulated guiding standards."
193
In dicta, the court offered some guidance as to how a court would
resolve a First Amendment challenge by the press against regulations
limiting their right of access to military operations in the future.194
It noted that no cases have directly addressed the role and limits of news
gathering under the First Amendment in a military context abroad, so
it analogized the facts to case law on questions involving the access
rights of the press and the public in other circumstances.' 95 The court
initially noted that the press does not have a right of access to fora
which have traditionally been characterized as private or closed to the
public, such as meetings involving the internal discussions of govern-
ment officials. 196 Limitations may also be placed on access to govern-
ment controlled institutions, such as prisons197 and military
193. Id. at 1572.
194. Id. at 1571-72 (dicta).
195. Id. at 1571 (dicta). The plaintiffs urged the court that the action did not seek to estab-
lish a new right of access because they were not requesting any affirmative assistance from the
government, only the freedom to report the events without interference. Id. The court re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument and found the question of press access to military operations "to
be one of first impression, the answer to which would require charting new constitutional
territory." Id
196. Id. (dicta) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974) (holding no
absolute unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process in all
circumstances)).
197. The Supreme Court has held that the press does not have a First Amendment right of
access to prisons. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974). In Pell the Supreme Court rejected a claim by journalists that prison
regulations prohibiting anyone to interview specific individual inmates infringed upon the free-
dom of the press and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pell, 417 U.S. at 819-21.
The Court noted that the regulations did not completely deny the press access to prisons. Id.
at 830. The Court also explained that allowing the press to interview specific inmates had
resulted in outbreaks of violence and had created security problems in the past. Id. at 832.
Against this factual background, the Court explained that the First Amendment does not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of access to information not available to the public
generally. Id at 833. The Court held that since the regulation did not deny the press access to
sources of information available to members of the general public, it did not abridge the pro-
tection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 835; see also Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding press does not have special right of access to government
information or sources of information within government's control, such as prison); Saxbe,
417 U.S. 843 (holding prison regulations that prohibit personal interviews between newsmen
and individually designated federal prison inmates does not violate First Amendment).
Unlike Pell, the DOD regulations completely deny non-pool group members access to
information. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1518-79. Pool group members of the press are
denied access to all information except information that they could gather while escorted by
the military in the pools. Id. at 1577-78. In addition, when the press has had unrestricted
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bases. 198 The Supreme Court, however, has held that the public and the
press have an almost absolute right of access to open places, such as
streets or parks.' 99
The court reviewed cases in which the Supreme Court focused on
the importance of an informed American citizenry and granted the press
a right of access to certain situations." The court acknowledged that
with respect to the public and the press's right of access to criminal trials,
the Supreme Court has generously interpreted the public's right to know
about government functioning under the First Amendment. 20 1  The
court described that a fundamental theme in Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia 202 and Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court 203 was to ensure press
access, so that the press could inform the public, thus enabling an in-
formed discussion of government affairs. 2" Further, the court empha-
sized that the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the press
performing a checking function against the abuse of government power
even when national security concerns were implicated.205 The court con-
cluded that the affirmative right to gather news, ideas and information is
access to military conflicts in the past, the press has acted with caution and restraint so as not
to endanger military security. THE GANNETr FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 14-15; Gott-
schalk, supra note 42, at 49.
198. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1571 (dicta). For example, in Greer v. Spock the
Supreme Court held that regulations that prohibited political campaigning and the distribution,
of literature without prior approval on a military base did not violate the First Amendment.
424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
199. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1572. The court cited Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
(1939). In Hague the Supreme Court held that an ordinance forbidding the distribution of
printed matter and the holding of public meetings without permits in streets and other public
places violated the First Amendment. Id. at 515.
200. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1572 (dicta); see supra notes 166-70 and accompa-
nying text.
201. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1572 (dicta) (citing Richmond Newspapers v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)).
202. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In Richmond Newspapers the Supreme Court held that, absent an
overriding interest, the right of the public and the press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed
under the First Amendment. Id. at 580. The Court explained its rationale:
These expressly guaranteed freedoms [in the First Amendment] share a common
core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the func-
tioning of government. Plainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of gov-
ernment of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which
criminal trials are conducted; as we have shown, recognition of this pervades the
centuries-old history and the opinions of this Court.
Id. at 575.
203. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Globe Newspaper.
204. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1572 (dicta).
205. Id. (dicta) (citing New York Times Co. v. United'States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
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strengthened by the case law and, after viewing the cases collectively,
found the media has at least some constitutional right of access to mili-
tary operations.2 °6
The court in Nation Magazine stated that the reasoning of the recent
Supreme Court decisions discussing the press's right of access to events
that affect the functioning of government should be followed when decid-
ing whether the press has a right of access to military operations.20 7 For
example, the Supreme Court case of Globe Newspaper v. Superior
Court 20 discussed the press's right of access to criminal trials, which
plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the govern-
ment.20 In Globe Newspaper the plaintiff argued that a statute excluding
the press and the public from a criminal trial for a specified sex offense
involving a victim under eighteen years of age violated the First Amend-
ment.2 10 The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects
the press's right of access to a particular fora if the place historically had
been open to the press and the general public211 and if the right of access
plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial pro-
cess and the government as a whole.212 The Court recognized that the
press does not have an absolute right of access and if the government is
attempting "to deny access to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive informa-
tion, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." '213
Applying this three-prong test to the facts of the case before it, the Court
concluded that the statute in question violated the First Amendment.21 4
206. Id. (dicta).
207. Id (dicta). The court, by refusing to decide the merits of the case, did not apply the
reasoning of the recent Supreme Court cases to the access restrictions imposed on the media
during the Persian Gulf War. Id
208. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
209. Id. at 606.
210. Id. at 602.
211. Id. at 605.
212. I at 606.
213. Id. at 606-07.
214. Id. at 605-10. The Court explained:
First, the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public.
"[A]t the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open.".. , Second, the right of access to crimi-
nal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process
and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the
quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both
the defendant and to society as a whole.... And in the broadest terms, public access
to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the
judicial process-an essential component in our structure of self government.... The
state's interests ... [in] the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and embarrassment ... and the encouragement of such victims to come
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Following the Court's directive in Nation Magazine, then, a court should
use the Globe Newspaper test when considering whether the press has a
right of access to military operations.2 5
B. Restrictions on the Press During the Persian Gulf War
1. The DOD security reviews were a constitutional prior restraint
It is clear that any system of prior restraints on expression bears a
heavy presumption against constitutional validity.216 Courts have recog-
nized, however, that during a time of war, the First Amendment's ban on
prior restraints may be overridden.217 The government carries the heavy
burden of showing a justification for the imposition of a prior restraint.21 8
During the Persian Gulf War, all news material was reviewed by
military censors before it was published or broadcast.219 The govern-
ment justified the security review of news content with the need to ensure
that neither the outcome of military operations nor the safety of United
States or coalition forces would be jeopardized. 220 The press expressed
dissatisfaction with the security review system and argued that articles
were censored for reasons other than national security.22I The security
review system itself would most likely pass constitutional muster.
222 If
some articles were censored for reasons that were unrelated to national
security, however, the security review system would be unconstitutional
forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner... [are] compelling.... But as
compelling as that interest is, it does not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is
clear that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the
interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is neces-
sary to protect the welfare of a minor victim.
Id (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)).
215. Commentators suggest that this three-prong test is consistent with the Court's recent
right of access decisions and should be used when determining whether the press has a right of
access to military operations. See generally Cassell, supra note 20, at 958-59 (Globe Newspaper
three-prong test should be used to determine whether press has right of access to military
operations); Jeanne L. Nowaczewski, Comment, The First Amendment Right ofAccess to Civil
Trials After Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CH. L. REv. 286, 290 (1984)
(Globe Newspaper analysis should be model for determining whether governmental proceeding
must be open to press).
216. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
217. Id. at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring).
218. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
219. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1577
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). See supra note 117 for a discussion of the security review imposed on the
news gathered during the war.
220. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1577.
221. THE GANNErT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 19. For example, descriptions of
soldiers' moods before and during battle were sometimes censored for reasons that appeared
unrelated to national security. Id.
222. See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
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as applied.223 Clearly, ensuring the secrecy, and therefore the safety and
success, of military operations during a war is a reasonable endeavor.224
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]hen a nation is at war many
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and
that no Court could regard them, as protected by any constitutional
right. ' 225 Publication of sensitive military information could endanger
the outcome of military operations as well as threaten the safety of
troops. 226 Thus, the government could very foreseeably demonstrate that
the special need for secrecy during wartime justified the security review
of news materials during the Persian Gulf War.
2. The pool groups violated the press's right of access
The Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court 227 crafted
a three-prong test for determining whether a press right of access exists,
as described above.228 Commentators suggest that this test should be
used when analyzing whether the press has a right of access to military
operations.229
The first level of analysis focuses on whether the place that the press
desires access to is properly afforded First Amendment protection.230 A
court will examine whether the place has historically been open to the
press and the general public.231 The press has historically had wide-
spread access to military operations and combat areas during wartime.232
From the War of Independence to the Vietnam War, the press has had
223. It is unlikely that the military could overcome the heavy presumption of unconstitu-
tionality regarding its censorship of articles discussing soldiers' moods. In Near v. Minnesota
ex reL Olson, the Supreme Court struck down a statutory prior restraint on the publication of a
particular article because the statute was unconstitutional as applied. 283 U.S. 697, 722-23
(1931). The Court endorsed broad immunity for the press from prior restraints and censor-
ship. Id. at 716-17. Thus, the military's prior restraint of news reports and broadcasts for
reasons unrelated to national security, such as soldiers' moods, appears to be an unconstitu-
tional application of the DOD regulations.
224. See Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (acknowledging that government censorship during wartime
acceptable to protect troop safety); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (recogniz-
ing censorship during wartime permissible to ensure national security).
225. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52.
226. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
227. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
228. Id. at 605-07; see supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
229. Cassell, supra note 20, at 958-59; Nowaczewski, supra note 215, at 290.
230. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-05.
231. Id. at 605. The Court in Globe Newspaper concluded that criminal trials in the United
States had long been presumptively open. Id.
232. See supra notes 24-90 and accompanying text.
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virtually unrestricted access to the front lines2 33 and has even accompa-
nied the military on aerial bombing raids.234 "This uniform rule of open-
ness has been viewed as significant in constitutional terms not only
'because the Constitution carries the gloss of history,' but also because 'a
tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
experience.' "235
The right of access must also play a significant role in the function-
ing of the government as a whole.236 Courts have recognized that the
press plays an important role in informing the American people so that
they can intelligently debate important issues. "Secrecy in government is
fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open
debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On
public issues there should be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' de-
bate." '237 Courts have emphasized that it is especially important that citi-
zens are informed in the area of national defense and international
affairs:
2 38
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present
in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint
upon executive policy and power in the areas of national de-
fense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citi-
zenry-in an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can here protect the values of democratic government. For this
reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and
free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amend-
ment. For without an informed and free press there cannot be
an enlightened people.239
While the First Amendment should protect the press's right of ac-
cess to military operations, the right is not absolute. 240 For press access
to be denied, the government must demonstrate that the denial of access
is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.2 4 1 Courts have recognized that national
233. See supra notes 24-90 and accompanying text.
234. HOHENBERG, supra note 26, at 270; Mor, supra note 25, at 743.
235. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605 (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
236. Id at 606. The Court in Globe Newspaper found that public scrutiny of a criminal trial
serves as a check on the judicial process and also fosters an appearance of fairness. Id
237. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964)).
238. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
239. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
240. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
241. Id. at 607. The Court held that although safeguarding the physical and psychological
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security is a compelling interest.242 The Supreme Court has expounded
that "[ilt is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is
more compelling than the security of the nation."'243 The government
restricted press access to ensure that news reports did not jeopardize mil-
itary operations or the safety and security of U.S. and coalition troops.2"
Further, the news media has acknowledged the importance of United
States military mission security and troop safety.24 The government
could, therefore, demonstrate that it denied the press unrestricted access
to the battlefield in an attempt to further a compelling governmental
interest.
While irresponsible press reports clearly threaten the success of mili-
tary operations, the restrictions on the media during the Persian Gulf
War were not narrowly tailored to address concerns of military secrecy
and national security. The government's interest in protecting national
security and troop safety could be served just as well by allowing the
press to have unrestricted access to military operations and restricting
the content of the news reports.24 6 Historically, the government has al-
lowed widespread access to the battlefield and then regulated the content
of the news reports to ensure that the reports did not endanger national
security.247
Mission security and troop safety interests have been pro-
well-being of a minor is a compelling interest, the mandatory closure of criminal trials was not
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 607-10.
242. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309 (1981) (recognizing government may sus-
pend passport if substantial likelihood of damage to national security); Snepp v. United States,
444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (acknowledging government has compelling interest in protecting
secrecy of information important to protect national security); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (finding President must turn in communications unless needed to protect
national security); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-26 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (finding publication of articles on Vietnam War would not jeopardize national
security); Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (holding prior restraint on
publication of articles did not fall within national security exception); Nation Magazine v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1571 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding need to limit
availability of information for reasons of national security legitimate); United States v. Pro-
gressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992-93 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (preliminary injunction issued Mar.
28, 1979) (holding prior restraint on publication of article about hydrogen bomb justified be-
cause of national security concerns), mandamus denied, 443 U.S. 709, appeal dismissed, 610
F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979) (moot).
243. Haig, 453 U.S. at 307 (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509
(1964)).
244. See supra note 117. The government expressed concern that photographs and televi-
sion broadcasts of combat scenes would communicate secrets to the enemy. Rosenstiel &
Lamb, supra note 99, at Al.
245. Text of Journalists' Joint Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1984, at A10.
246. Id.
247. See supra notes 24-90 and accompanying text.
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tected-when essential-by limiting the number of journalists
accompanying the troops, by voluntary reporting restraints, by
limited censorship of information that might aid the enemy or
by delay in the filing of dispatches; but not by exclusion of all
journalists. Exclusion of journalists never has been deemed ap-
propriate .... 24'
During prior American military conflicts, press reports and broad-
casts have not endangered military operations or troop safety.24 9 More-
over, the military has declined to offer specific examples of the press
harming national security during previous military conflicts. 250 The mili-
tary's criticism of the press's reporting of the Vietnam War was not based
upon incidents of security violations. 25 1 In fact, Pentagon spokesman
Pete Williams acknowledged that with voluntary self-censorship during
the Vietnam War only five or six reporters violated the military guide-
lines.25 2 The military was dissatisfied with the political results of the me-
dia's reporting of the war-public support for the war decreased 25 3 and
Congress refused to continue funding of the war.25 4 Since the press has
followed the military's reporting guidelines in past wars without endan-
gering national security, the DOD regulations promulgated during the
Persian Gulf War were unnecessary.
The access restrictions placed on the media during the Persian Gulf
War, following the Supreme Court's analysis in Globe Newspaper, fail to
pass constitutional scrutiny. Press access to military conflicts is properly
afforded First Amendment protection. 255 Historically, the press has had
widespread access to military conflicts.256 The press plays a vital role in
informing the people so they can intelligently debate important issues.25 7
The DOD regulations violate the First Amendment because even though
the government's interest in national security is compelling, the regula-
tions were not narrowly tailored. 258
248. Text of Journalists' Joint Statement, supra note 245, at A10.
249. Middleton, supra note 100, at 37.
250. See Rosenstiel & Lamb, supra note 99, at A16.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 435-36 (1978).
254. Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 Stat. 99,
129 (1973).
255. See supra notes 227-52 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 24-90 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text; infra notes 272-75 and accompanying
text.
258. See supra notes 246-54 and accompanying text.
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
The government's interest in protecting effective military operations
and ensuring the safety of United States troops can be reconciled with
the press's interest in providing an independent source of military infor-
mation to the public.2 9 First, the DOD should develop a liberal system
of accreditation for news reporters who desire access to combat. 2 ° Dur-
ing past wars, liberal accreditation programs for journalists did not cre-
ate any security problems for the military. 26 1 All journalists who desire
to be accredited should show some form of documentation verifying that
they are journalists.26 2 In turn, journalists must agree to abide by the
military's rules and be prepared to have their accreditation revoked if
they violate the rules. A permissive accreditation system would ensure
that all viewpoints on the war could be expressed, thereby encouraging
public debate on the issues. This system would also be consistent with
the history of independent war correspondents reporting on United
States military conflicts.26 3
The military should institute a system of voluntary censorship and
promulgate guidelines for the media to follow. For example, such guide-
lines should counsel the media not to publish or broadcast specific nu-
merical information about troop strength or location of troops, details of
future military plans, information about intelligence collection activities
or details of the results of intelligence collection.2 4 If any reporter pub-
lished or broadcast prohibited information, the military could revoke
their accreditation. In the past, voluntary censorship based on reason-
able content restrictions effectively safeguarded military security.265 For
example, during World War II, the government instituted a system of
voluntary self-censorship for the press and, even though there was no
penalty for violators, the press abided by the guidelines.2 66 Similarly,
voluntary self-censorship of news content was the only form of censor-
ship during the Vietnam War.267 Again, the press voluntarily observed
259. See infra notes 260-73 and accompanying text.
260. For example, during the Vietnam War, the military instituted a liberal accreditation
system for journalists. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 84, at 403.
261. See id.
262. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text for a description of the accreditation
system for the media during the Vietnam War.
263. See supra notes 24-90 and accompanying text.
264. For example, the ground rules promulgated during the Persian Gulf War could be
used as a guide. See supra note 117.
265. HOHENBERG, supra note 26, at 184; THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at
14-15.
266. MoTr, supra note 25, at 762-63.
267. THE GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 31, at 14.
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the military's publication and broadcast guidelines.268
Finally, the military should allow accredited reporters unrestricted
access to military operations during a war.269 Any national security con-
cerns could be addressed through prohibitions in the publishing and
broadcast guidelines.2 70 Even if the government prohibits the publica-
tion or broadcasting of information, if the reporters have access to the
battlefield, they can see, and later report, the details about the various
military operations.2 7 1 The press provides an important check on the
government and the military.272  "[W]orse calamities would result if
those in power at the moment could manage affairs without having their
conduct and policies subjected to a thorough-going review. Such a re-
view may point out our errors or operate as a deterrent or eventually
cause a change of rulers. "273
Moreover, unrestricted media access to military operations is essen-
tial for the media to be able to independently inform the public about a
war.274 It is vital that a voter has the opportunity to read and hear infor-
mation and arguments about a war.275 Indeed, the First Amendment's
"purpose is to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which
the citizens of a self-governing society must deal. '276 Once informed,
members of the public can debate the merits of a war and foreign policy
and vote accordingly. 277 The Vietnam War provides a good example of
268. Id. at 14-15; Gottschalk, supra note 42, at 49.
269. See Text of Journalists' Joint Statement, supra note 245, at A10.
270. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
271. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 97, § 1, at 20. During the United States invasion of Gre-
nada, reporters were denied access to the island and later journalists reported that Reagan
Administration officials disseminated much inaccurate information that went uncontradicted
because the press was not present to independently report on the invasion. Id.
272. See 1 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 41
(1947).
273. Id
274. See Text of Journalists' Joint Statement, supra note 245, at A10.
Our society remains healthy and free primarily because our public has an independ-
ent source of information about its Government. Preservation of this principle is
essential to the proper functioning of our constitutional democracy and to our na-
tional well-being. Without this open flow of information, our system of self-govern-
ment would not work.
Id.
275. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 75 (1960).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 116. "In the view of the Constitution, then, we the people are not only the
supreme agency. We are also, politically, an active electorate-a Fourth, or perhaps better, a
First Branch which, through its reserved power, governs at the polls." Id. "Liberty of speech
and of the press may be described as public opinion in the soft. Open discussion eventually
culminates in votes." CHAFEE, supra note 272, at 40.
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the press performing its watchdog function. The press informed the pub-
lic about the war and, in turn, the public voiced its opposition to the war
to its elected representatives.2 78 Congress reacted to public opinion and
refused to continue military funding of the war.2 79
V. CONCLUSION
From the War of Independence through the Vietnam War, the press
has had widespread access to the battlefield,2 8 ° although at times, the
government has imposed censorship restrictions on the press to protect
military security and troop safety.2 8 1 During the Vietnam War, the press
enjoyed widespread access to combat and the government only employed
a system of voluntary self-censorship.28 Even though the press observed
the military security guidelines and thereby protected national security,
the military was dissatisfied with the media's reporting of the war.2 83
The military blamed the press for decreasing public support for the war
and for Congress's decision to discontinue funding of the war.2 84
Determined to influence public opinion by controlling the content of
what the public reads and sees during military conflicts, the military be-
gan to restrict press access to the battlefield by instituting a pool group
system.2 85 During the invasion of Grenada in 1983 and the invasion of
Panama in 1989, the military used the pool group system and was satis-
fied with the political results. 286 During the Persian Gulf War, the gov-
ernment again denied the press unrestricted access to the battlefield.
28 7
In addition, the government subjected all news reports and broadcasts to
a security review.28 8 Although the press has had widespread access to
the battlefield throughout the history of American military conflicts,28 9
and press access restrictions are unnecessary to protect national secur-
ity,290 it appears as though the pool group system will be used in the
278. See 119 CONG. REC. 22,284 (1973) (statement of Senator Hughes); see also LEWY,
supra note 253, at 435-36 (1978) (public opposition to American involvement in Vietnam
brought end to war).
279. See Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 Stat.
99, 129 (1973). On June 29, 1973, Congress voted to end funding of the Vietnam War. Id.
280. See supra notes 24-90 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 24-90 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 100, 278-79 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 91-114 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 91-114 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 24-90 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
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future.291
The First Amendment protects the press against prepublication cen-
sorship and access restrictions.292 Although censorship of news reports
is not an unconstitutional prior restraint, the denial of press access to the
battlefield during wartime violates the First Amendment.293 Freedom of
the press is important for the functioning of our system of democratic
government.294 There is no need for the government to overly restrict
the press295 because past experience proves that the press will voluntarily
adhere to military guidelines to protect national security. Clearly a sys-
tem of voluntary censorship and widespread press access safeguards the
First Amendment as well as national security.296 In future military con-
flicts, the government should reinstate the prior system of voluntary cen-
sorship and grant the press widespread access to battlefields.
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291. See Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1569
(1991).
292. See supra notes 146-215 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 217-58 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
* This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Robert R. Marlin and Diane May, and to
my husband, Brian D. Boydston, for their love and understanding. Special thanks to Professor
Gary Williams for his helpful editorial comments and suggestions.
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